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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TESTIMONY OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF MIRANDA IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT
PURPOSES. Oregon v. Hass, 43 U.S.L.W. 4417 (U.S. March 19,
1975).
In Oregon v. Hass,' the United States Supreme Court held that
when a suspect in police custody has been given the warnings required
by Miranda v. Arizona,' and the individual has requested that he be al-
lowed to telephone his attorney, any inculpatory information that he has
given before his attorney arrives may be used for the purposes of im-
peachment at trial. Hass was charged with burglary in connection with
the theft of two bicycles, one of which had been recovered by the
owner. On the day of the theft Hass was arrested and questioned by
an Oregon State Patrol officer. Miranda warnings had been given be-
fore the interrogation had begun and Hass had given a valid waiver.
He admitted that he had stolen the two bicycles and that he knew where
one of them was located. In route to the location of the stolen bicycle,
Hass asked that he be allowed to telephone an attorney. The officer
told him that he would be allowed to do so when they returned to the
police station. Hass then pointed out the location of the missing bicycle
and the two residences from which the bicycles had been stolen.
At trial, the officer was allowed to testify before the jury that the
defendant had admitted stealing the bicycles. However, the informa-
tion obtained from the defendant after he had requested his attorney
1. 43 U.S.L.W. 4417 (U.S. March 19, 1975).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court established requirements
for custodial interrogation which had to be met before a suspect's statements would be
admissible in evidence at trial:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to re-
main silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attor-
ney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not want to be interrogated,
the police may not question him.
Id. at 444-45. Later in the opinion, the Court also said "[ilf the individual states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id.
at 474.
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was ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case in chief. Hass then
took the stand and testified that he and two friends were "riding
around" in his Volkswagen truck on the day of the thefts. He said his
friends departed from the vehicle while he drove slowly down the
street. Subsequently, the two friends reappeared with bicycles which
Hass said he did not at first realize were stolen. The defendant ad-
mitted telling the police officer that he had stolen the two bicycles, but
that he had no idea what his friends were going to do and did not know
where the victims' residences were located.
The police officer testified in rebuttal that Hass had pointed out
the two residences from which the thefts had occurred. The trial court
instructed the jury that the prior inconsistent statement of the defend-
ant, obtained in violation of Miranda, could not be used as proof of the
defendant's guilt but could be considered in deciding the credibility of
Hass. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision
and the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the high court of Oregon and returned to the initial
ruling of the trial court.3
The Supreme Court's reversal of the Oregon court is another step
in the Court's apparent retreat from the protection against self-incrimi-
nation that was established in Miranda. The undermining of the Mi-
randa decision initially began with the case of Harris v. New York. 4
Harris was arrested for selling heroin. After his arrest he was inter-
rogated by police but was never given the Miranda warnings.5 At trial
he testified to statements which were inconsistent with what he had
earlier told police. The prosecution on cross-examination introduced
evidence which showed that Harris had made prior inconsistent state-
ments. The trial court allowed the jury to use Harris' prior statements
for the purpose of deciding his credibility but not his guilt., The Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, which, according to the
dissent, was in direct conflict with the Miranda decision.7 Chief Jus-
tice Warren had said in Miranda that the prosecution could not use
statements stemming from custodial interrogation if the procedural
3. Oregon v. Hass, 13 Ore. App. 368, 510 P.2d 852, a-/ d, 267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d
671 (1973), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 823 (1974), rev'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 4417 (U.S. March
19, 1975).
4. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
5. The interrogation in Harris took place before Miranda had been decided by the
Supreme Court.
6. Id. at 223.
7. Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 10: 697
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
safeguards established in Miranda were not met. Chief Justice Burger,
in writing the majority opinion for Harris, dealt with the direct conflict
by carving out an exception to the Miranda decision. The theory was
that all evidence obtained in a way which violated the Miranda safe-
guards was barred from being used in the prosecution's case in chief.
However, not all evidence ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case
in chief was to be barred for all other reasons. To justify the result
reached in Harris, Chief Justice Burger followed Walder v. United
States,' a case in which physical evidence, impermissible for use in the
prosecution's case in chief, was permitted for the purpose of impeach-
ment. He quoted the majority opinion of Walder which said, "[t]here
is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to
perjurous testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to chal-
lenge his credibility."9  The tone of the opinion pointed to an un-
willingness to allow perjurous testimony to go uncontrolled merely be-
cause the police had illegally gathered the evidence which they pos-
sessed. The Harris majority said, "[tihe shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."' 0
The new test of admissibility was to be whether trustworthiness of the
evidence was sufficient to meet legal standards.'1 The Harris decision
evidenced a dislike, by certain members of the court, of Miranda. It
was clear that further attacks upon Miranda would come in the future.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Hass pinpointed the real
issue of the case as whether Harris had any bearing on the Hass case."
8. 347 U.S 62 (1954).
9. Id. at 65.
10. 401 U.S. at 226.
11. Id. at 224.
12. In his dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the idea that the only real issue
involved in Hass was the bearing which Harris had upon the case. In Hass the respond-
ent claimed that when state law is more restrictive against the prosecution than federal
law, the Court is unable to compel ja state to conform to federal law. This claim arose
because the Constitution of Oregon had a separate prohibition against compulsory self
incrimination. Justice Marshall was concerned with the fact that the lower courts con-
ceivably could have based their decisions upon state law rather than federal and there-
fore the result reached in the Hass case would be incorrect. Concluding that the case
should be remanded, he said, "the Court should not review a state decision reversing
a conviction unless it is quite clear that the state court has resolved all applicable state
law questions adversely to the defendant and that it feels compelled by its view of the
federal constitutional issue to reverse the conviction at hand." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4421.
The majority dismissed the claim, finding that the Oregon court's decision did not rest
on the Oregon Constitution or state law since neither was cited. "'The fact that the Ore-
gon courts found it necessary to attempt to distinguish Harris v. New York... reveals
the federal basis." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4419.
1975]
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He was unable to find a valid distinction that could exist be-
tween the Hass and Harris cases:
[As in Harris] the impeaching material would provide valu-
able aid to the jury in assessing the defendant's credibil-
ity. .. [and] 'the benefits of this process should not be lost
.. .' ITnhere is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in
question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case
in chief. . . . Here, too, the shield provided by Miranda is
not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or
even prejuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances.13
Justice Blackmun found that if all those reasons sufficed in Harris then
the same result must therefore exist in Hass.
Some writers have viewed the Supreme Court's holding in Harris
to have been based upon a misapplication of prior case law.14  Hass
can also be characterized as such a misapplication by the Court. Justice
Blackmun's entire opinion is based on the rationale that Harris and Hass
are not capable of being differentiated and therefore the result must
be the same. However, the Supreme Court of Oregon and the dissent
of Justice Brennan do point a significant difference between the two
cases. In Harris there were no Miranda warnings given whatsoever.
The interrogation in Harris took place before the Miranda decision had
been announced so it is not surprising that the police officers had not
given the warnings. The officers at that time did not realize that in-
formation obtained in such a way would be inadmissible in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief. There was no deterrent effect to illegal police ac-
tions of that type and no incentive to refrain from such illegal interroga-
tion.
The Court could easily have distinguished the two cases on the
differing effect that each result might have upon police conduct and
the public's constitutional rights. The fact that much of the rationale
used for deciding Harris may also apply to Hass is not conclusive that
each case should have the same result when the very different aspects
of the two cases are also examined.
Although Justice Blackmun was not able to differentiate between
Hass and Harris he did admit that police conduct might be affected by
the Hass decision:
13. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4419.
14. Note, Admitting the Inadmissible-The Wounding of Miranda, 23 BAYLOR L.
RBv. 639 (1971); 48 Cm.-KENr L. Ray. 124 (1971); 39 Gao. WASH. L. RaV. 1241
(1971); 85 HAv. L. REV. 44 (1971). These writers all viewed the Court's use of
Walder v. United States as a misapplication of the Walder decision to Hards.
[Vol. 10:697
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One might concede that when proper Miranda warnings
have been given, and the officer then continues his interroga-
tion after the suspect asks for an attorney, the officer may
be said to have little to lose and perhaps something to gain
by way of possibly uncovering impeachment material.15
However, Justice Blackmun concluded there was only a speculative
possibility of gaining from such conduct and, "[i]n any event, the bal-
ance was struck in Harris, and we are not disposed to change it now."1
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, was much more dissatisfied with
what effect the Hass decision may have upon police conduct. Even
after Harris the police had some incentive to follow Miranda because
if the warnings were given the accused might still make statements
which could be used in the prosecution's case in chief. However, after
the holding in Hass, if a suspect requests an attorney, the interrogation
will probably continue until the suspect's attorney arrives. While the
police still have an incentive to give the Miranda warnings, the Hass
decision allows something to be gained by continued illegal interroga-
tion of a suspect. The Court has now made it possible for the police
to obtain information, which, so long as voluntarily given, may be val-
uable in impeaching the suspect's testimony at trial, effectively prevent-
ing him from taking the stand in his own defense.
When Brennan reiterated his dissent for the Harris decision it is
obvious that he could not condone such a violation of the Miranda
rules:
[lilt is monstrous that the courts should aid or abet the law-
breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that "[n]othing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse its disregard of the charter of its own
existence." 17
Chief Justice Burger was willing, in Harris, to allow illegally obtained
evidence to enjoy an advantage over perjurous testimony in a trial, but
Justice Brennan's dissent in Hass shows that he would rather protect
the individual from self incrimination than protect the public from per-
jury.
The decision reached in Hass has done a great deal to further
weaken the protection against self-incrimination that was created in
Miranda. However, in the future, the Hass decision may result in more
15. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4420.
16. Id.
17. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ore-
gon v. Hass, 43 U.S.L.W. 4417, 4420 (U.S. March 19, 1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1975]
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than a mere weakening of Miranda. Chief Justice Warren's opinion
in Miranda created a new standard for measuring whether an individual
had been compelled to testify against himself. The Chief Justice did not
view compulsion as being merely physical coercion or abuse. He viewed
custodial interrogation of a suspect as being inherently a form of com-
pulsion. The new rules were intended to create a standard beyond
which the police could not go. Whether there was actual compulsion
or not, the Court would look to a violation of the Miranda rules as con-
stituting compulsion. The new standard eliminated the need for a case
by case analysis of the totality of the circumstances which had formerly
been used to decide whether compulsion existed.
In Hass, the Court has decided that a mere violation of Miranda
no longer makes testimony inadmissible for all purposes. A change
has been made in the method the Court uses in deciding whether evi-
dence to be used for impeachment purposes has been compelled. Jus-
tice Blackmun described the standard to be used when he said, "[i]f
in a given case, the officer's conduct amounts to abuse, that case like
those involving coercion or duress may be taken care of when it arises
measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and
trustworthiness."' 8 By returning to the standard of voluntariness, for
evidence to be used in impeaching a defendant's credibility, the Court
has involved itself in duplicity. There are now two standards that must
be used for evaluating whether the defendant's statements have been
compelled. Not only must a trial judge determine whether inculpatory
statements were obtained in compliance with Miranda for purposes of
the prosecution's case in chief, he must also determine, subject to re-
view by the Supreme Court, whether statements obtained in violation
of Miranda were voluntarily made under the traditional "totality of the
circumstances" test for the purposes of impeachment. It is unlikely
that the court will allow these dual standards to continue. If the Court
can so easily return to a case by case approach for such statements, it
is but a few cases away until it decides to use the voluntariness test
for all statements made by the accused, perhaps using Hass as the cor-
nerstone for the abolishment of Miranda altogether.
Douglas B. Chomeau
18. 43 U.S.L.W. at 4420.
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